A PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH SHIFTING

EXECUTORY DEVISES.
Now that the device (which must have been a source of
considerable profit and interest to lawyers of a few generations
ago) known as barring contingent remainders has been in these
practical days entirely done away with, the very name of "executory devise" is rapidly becoming obsolete. Unquestionably the
principal importance of the distinction between executory devises
and contingent remainders grew out of the fact that at common
law the contingent remainders were destructible, whereas under
Pells v. Brown executory devises were not; hence when this
distinction is done away with by making all contingent future
interests equally indestructible, it is not often desirable or necessary to classify contingent future interests under the former
heads of remainders and executory devises, and it is perhaps
questionable how far the practicing lawyer of the present day
remembers the distinction which was once one of the fundamental distinctions of the law of property. At the same time, there
are certain inherent differences between contingent remainders
and executory devises which continue to exist in spite of the fact
that they are both indestructible at the present day. For example,
the most common form of executory devise is the giving by will
of an estate in fee simple to A with the proviso that on the happening of a given contingency the fee shall be taken from A and
given to B. By anal6gy to the older "uses", the gift to B in the
above illustration may for convenience be described as a shifting executory devise. There is one not uncommon problem
arising in connection with such shifting executory devises which
it is proposed to briefly consider.
That problem has two sides which may be briefly stated as
follows: We start in each case with the above illustration,
to wit, an estate given by will to A in fee with a proviso that
upon the happening of a given contingency it shall be given to B.
The problems are: (i) Suppose for some reason A is incompetent to take-- who is entitled? (2) Suppose the contingency
(IS1)
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happens and that B for some reason cannot take-to whom
does the estate belong?
Taking up the first problem, the alternatives are perfectly
clear; if A cannot take, either B takes, or the property passes
to the residuary devisee or to the heirs of the testator as the
case may be. In an interesting line of cases on the subject the
problem seems t6 have been originally treated as a contest between B and the residuary devisees or heirs of the testator,
without recognizing that in orderto the proper determination
of the problem another factor must be determined, i.e., has the
contingency happened on which B was to take? It is believed
that if the importance of determining this factor is, always
kept prominently in mind, any doubt that may seem to beraised by the cases can be easily removed. For example in
Jones v. Westcomb,1 A devised a term of years to his wife foi
life and "after her death to the child she was then enseint with.
And if such child die before it came to 21", then to B. Upon
the death of testator it appeared that the wife was not enseint;
it was nevertheless held that the gift to B took effect. No attention appears to have been given to-'the inquiry whether the
event had not literally happened (i. e., the supposed unborn child.
ing our inquiry to this point, it is submitted that though the
event had not literally happened (i. e., the supposed unborn child
did not die before it came to 2! ) yet that substantially what the
testator meant was that if such unborn child should not reach'
.21, B should take, and that properly construed this language
includes the possibility of the supposed unborn child not ever
being born (or even not ever having -existed), as well as the
possibility of such child being born and then failing to reach 2x.
It is submitted that in construing such a clause the court may
properly take into consideration the influences which affect a
man in making a disposition of this character, and may therefore construe such disposition not literally but to carry out the
testator's real intent; but it should be carefully noted that this
is a very different matter from simply ignoring the inquiry
I1 Ea. Ca& AL
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whether the condition contemplated by the testator has occurred
or not, and giving the property to, B simply because the first
taker does not take. The latter is believed to be an unsound
method of approaching the problem involved.
In Willing v. Baine 2 the testator by will devised 2oo pounds
apiece to his children payable at their respective ages of 21
"and if any of them die before-they are 21, then the legacy given,
to the person so dying to go to the surviving children." One
of the children died in the testator's lifetime, and the questionarose whether the legacy to him should go to the surviving children, or be treated as a lapsed legacy and sink into the surplus for
the benefit of the residuary legatees. It was held that "the
legacy was well given over to the surviving children." Though
no stress is laid upon the point in the reported decision, yet it is
clear that the condition had happened upon which the gift over
was to take effect, i. e., one of the children had died before
reaching 2r. The testator probably pictured to himself the
case of a child surviving himself and thereafter dying under 21,
but he has not in any sense stipulated that the gift over shall
only take effect if the child shall survive. him, and looking
beyond the letter of the will to those sentiments which would
naturally affect a testator under similar circumstances, it is difficult to see why if he had directly contemplated the possibility
of the child dying in his lifetime, he should not still have made
the same dispositiori of his property.
In Azelyn v Ward 3 a testator devised certain real estate
to his brother on condition -that within three months after the
testator's decease the brother should execute a general release
of all claims against the estate: "But if his brother should neglect
to give such release," then to B. The brother happened to die
in the lifetime of the testator, and the question was whether
the gift over to B should take effect. In sustaining the gift
to B, Lord Hardwicke urges that "the question will very much
turn on this: whether this devise over is to be considered, and
'3 P. Wins. 113.
i Ves. Sr. 4.
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the contingency on which it is given, as a strict condition, or a
conditional limitation", and holds that the gift over to B was a
conditional limitation, and that therefore, the strict letter of the
contingency need not b complied with. In these more practical
days. however, when the legal mind is not so impressed with
the significance of fine spun distinctions between conditions and
conditional limitations, it would seem a sounder view simply
to inquire whether, considering the matter from the point of
view of the testator, the event had happened on which-B3 was
to take, and it is submitted that the event had happened. B was
intended to take this land unless the lrother executed a general
release; this the latter did not do. True he died before the
testator and it could not, therefore, literally be said that he
had either neglected or refused to give such general release;
nevertheless the fact remains that the testator's scheme clearly
was that B was to take this real estate unless the brother should
give such general release, and as the brother did not do so
(though with no default on his part) it is clear that B ought
to take. The result reached by Lord Hardwicke seems, therefore, clearly right, altho the method of reaching it is perhaps
subject to criticism. In Doe v. Brabant" the testatrix gave certain funds to tritees in trust for her stepdaughter then of the
age of 12 years until she should attain 21, with direction to pay
the principal to her on reaching 21. There was a further
pros iso in case she should die under 21 leaving children, that
such children should take on reaching 21: and finally a proviso
in case she should die under zi without leaving children, or leaving children and they should all die under 21, then to B. The
stepdaughter married, reached 21 and died in the testator's lifetime leaving two children. The question was whether they were
entitled to the fund, and it was held that they were not because
their mother did not die under 21. Hence the gift to any children of hers on reaching zi became ineffective. There can be
no doubt as to the propriety of this decision; the case is particularly important because all of the judges in their short opinions
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agree in the statement of the reason why the gift over should not
take effect. Lord Kenyon for example says, "Here nothing was
given to the grandchildren, but upon an event which did not
happen." This very briefly reported case brings out clearly the
underlying principle. It is quite possible-indeed it is almost
certain-that if the testatrix had foreseen what happened she
would have in that case made the same disposition to the children
of her stepdaughter; but it is entirely clear that the court has
not the right to make any guess, however likely, as to what the
testatrix would have done--on the contrary the court is limited
to deciding whether fairly construed the' event has happened on
which the testatrix intended the gift over to take effect.
In, Lomas v. Wright 5 a testator having several legitimate
children by one Mary Lomas, by deed of trust conveyed certainproperties to trustees in trust in case she should have another
such child, then such after born child would be entitled out of the
-income to an annuity of 25 pounds, and subject to such charge
the, principal of said trust fund to be held for the use of one H;
in case, however, H should die under age and without issue,
then the principal to be held for the use of such after born child
if a son, in fee; but if there should be no after born son, or in
case there should be one and he should die under age and without
issue, then the principal to be held for the use of one 0. There
was an after born son who attained his age of 21, but who was
incompetent to take under the familiar rule invalidating devises
which tend to encourage illicit relations. H died under age and
without issue, and the question was whether 0 should take. It
was claimed on his behalf that the only prior beneficiaries were
H and the after born son, and that they being for different reasons out of the way, the executory devise to 0 should take effect.
It was held, however, that as the gift to 0 was conditioned on
the after born child dying before reaching 21, and as in fact
he attained 21, the gift to 0 failed. It will be noted that the
principle previously stated was here correctly applied.
62

Myl. & Y. 76g.
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In Tarbuck v. Tarb.uck the testator devised certain lands
to his son James for life, remainder to his children in equal
shares in fee; he devised certain other lands to his son Jonathan
for life, remainder to his children in equal shares in fee. Hie
then provided that if either should die without leaying lawful
issue the lands devised to him for life should go to his brother
in fee. And further that if both should die without leaving lawful issue, both parcels of land should go to X in fee. Both
the sons died in the testator's lifetime, James leaving a child who
survived his father and his Uncle Jpn'athan, bqt who died in the
lifetime of the testator, and Jonathan dying without children.
The question was whether the gift over to'X took effect. In
holding that it did not, the Master of the Rolls pointed out
that the gift to X was only to take effect in the event of James
and Jonathan dying without children, and that the circumstance
that they happened to die in the testator's lifetime was immaterial. Again the principle above stated was correctly applied.
In Eavestaff v. Austin 7 the testatrix having created a fund
on which the interest was to be paid to her brother William during his life, provided that at his death a portion should be set
apart-and the income thereon paid to a granddaughter A for her
life; "and I direct that after her death the.same (apparently
meaning the income) shall be equally divided between the children of my nephew J." By a codicil to her will the testatrix
revoked the gift of the annuity to A, and when the testatrix
and the brother had both died A was still living, and the question
was whether the bequest to the children of J was accelerated by
the revocation of the bequest to A, or whether its enjoyment
was to be postponed till the decease of. A. The Master of the
Rolls held that the bequest was accelerated. There is.an obvious
distinction between this and the prior cases. In this case the
holder of the future interest originally had, not an executory
devise which was subject to a contingency which might not
happen, but a vested future interest, and it is therefore consistent
4 L J. & S. C -. x29
19 Beav. 59!.
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with the principle established in the prior cases to allow the gift
over to take effect sooner than was originally intended; the
only alternative would be a partial intestacy (in this case till
the death of A), and there is a very strong presumption against
any such consequence.
Hughes v. Ellis8 is an interesting case. By will dated .1823
the testator devised the residue of his estate to his wife; but if
she should die intestate then to X. She died intestate a few
weeks before the testator, and the question was whether the gift
over took effect; it was held by the Master of the Rolls that it
did not. The decision is correct. At the time a married woman
was not legally competent to make a will; so that, though the
testator -had not used such expression, it was entirely evident
that he must have meant that if his wife should die intestate
after his oun death, X should take. Even in these more modem
days when a married woman may lawfully make a will, it is
submitted that the same result should be reached, for the reason
that though the testator does not expressly say so, he evidently
must mean that if his wife should die intestate as to the property
received front him, then X should take, and in the very nature
of things it would be impossible for his wife to dispose of the
property received from him by-her will unless she survive him,
and thereby receive something from him.
The net result of the cases therefore is that although the
decisions were not always based on the correct principle, yet
since the principle has been clearly established there is now no
question but what the gift over to B will not take effect simply
because the prior gift to A has for some reason failed; in
order to enable B to claim he must be able to show, not simply
that A is out of the way, but also in addition that the contingencyon which he B was to take has, not necessarily literally, but at
least substantially occurred.
The second class of cases presents the converse of those
just considered. In the second group the devise to A, in fee
has taken effect, the contingency on which the fee is to go to B
82o Beav. 9.
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has also happened, and the difficulty is caused by the fact that B
for some reason is incompetent to take. The question arises
whether; as B clearly cannot take, the property shall pass to
the residuary devisees or heirs of the testator on the one hand,
or; whether it shall continue in A on the theory that it was only
taken from A in order that B might have it, and that if B
cannot take, A shall not be deprived. The cases on this point
are not in agreement as will appear from the. following short
examination of the principal authorities.
In Harrisonv. Foreman9 a testator by will devised certain
annuities to one B for life, and after her decease, the principal
to be given to one P and one S 'in equal shares; in case either
of them died in B's lifetime, the whole to the survivor livifg at
B's death: P and S both died after the testator but in the
lifetime of B; upon B's. death the fund was claimed by the representative of P and S and by the residuary devisees of the testator. The Master of the Rolls found in favor of the representative of P and S, holding that "the contingency described in that
part of the will never took place; there. being no survivor of
these two persons at that time (meaning at the death of B)."
The case is not an authority therefore on the question. What
happens if the contingency has occurred and B cannot take?
It simply construes the condition, holding that the thing contemplated by the testator not having happened at all, there is no
reason why the property should- be taken from A.
In Jackson v. Noble 10 a testator gave certain moneys to
trustees in trust for his daughter M during her life and at her
death for her heirs; provided that in case she should have no
children, the principal should go to his son G, or in case of his
decease before M, then to his children. After the testator's
death G died without leaving children. The question was what
the effect of this was upon M's estate; obviously G could not
take it because the gift to him was contingent on his surviving
M, and his children could not take because he left no children.
5 Ves.
" 2
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It was held by the Master of the Rolls "that the gift over was to
take effect only in the event of M's marrying and dying without

issue in the lifetime of her brother, or of such child or children
as he might happen to leave". As she had not died in the lifetime of her children or of any child or children of his, he decided
that the estate of M became indefeasible.
Doc v. Eyre 11 is perhaps the leading case in England. One
M had a power of appointment of a fund among her children ;.
she made certain appointments to her two children with a proviso that if neither should be living at her husband's death her
father-in-law should take. Both of them died before the husband, who of course was incompetent to take within the language of the power. It was held that as the event had happened
on which the testatrix expected the father-in-law to take, the
originally vested interests of the two children determined and
the estate passed as in default of appointment. The case is
almost unique in that it contains an elaborate note by the reporter
questioning, on the authority of JLckson v. Noble, "the propriety
12
of the decision reached by the court.
Doc v. Eyre has been consistently followed in England.
In Robinson v. Wood I" the testator devised certain property to.
his daughter H in fee with a proviso that if she should die
under 21 leaving lawful issue, the issue to take as tenants in common; but in case she should die under 21 without lawful issue.,
then in trust for his wife if she should be then his widow, and
unmarried, and one N for life, and after the decease of the
survivor to pay the proceeds to P Society. The testator died
leaving his daughter A surviving him, and the testator's widow
and N both died in the lifetime of the daughter, who later died
under 21, without ever having been married. This was a suit
filed by the daughter's heir at law claiming that, as the gift to
, 5 C.. B. 713.
" Sugden on Powers 513-4 comments on the reporter's note, approves the
finding in Doc v. Eyre, but adds (as indeed is obvious) that if inconsistent
with the prior case of Jackson v. Noble, Doe v. Eyre being a decision by the
Exchequer Chamber of course overrules the prior Chancery decision.
2,- L T. Ch. 26.
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the P Society was void under the Statute of Mortmain, he
was entitled. Following Doe v. Eyre somewhat reluctantly the

Vice-Chancellor held that the heir-at-law of the daughter was not
entitled. Finally in O'Mahoncy v. Burdett.'1 there was a gift
by will to one A with a proviso that if she should die unmarried
or without children then to B. B died in the lifetime of the
testator so that the gift to him lapsed. It was held nevertheless
by the House of Lords that A's gift was divested upon her
death without children. It must, therefore, be taken as settled
under the English decisions that if the contingency happens,
the gift to A fails even though the gift over to B does not take
effect. It should be added that Jarman 1: attempts to reconcile
Jackson v. Noble with Doe v. Eyre, saying "The difference in
short is between a failure of the posterior gift by lapse, letting
in the title of the heir or residuary devisee (as the case may be),
and a failure in- event, of which the prior devisee has the benefit." It, of course, is true that if the event has not happened
on which the gift to A fails, A continues to enjoy his gift, but
it is. a little difficult to see why in Jackson v. Noble the contingency contemplated, namely the death of the daughter without
child or children, did not happen, and why therefore the problem is not the same in that case as in Doe v. Eyre, namely, assuming that the contingency has happened, but that the gift over for
some reason cannot take effect, shall A continue to hold, 'and
the English cases with the exception of Jackson v. Noble held
with reasonable uniformity that he shall not
It would unduly prolong this paper to discuss thg American
cases, which will be only briefly referred to. Drumnmond v.
Drummond "oand Dusenberry v. Johnson,'7 in both of which
the general doctrine of Jackson v. Noble is approved, although
in the latter Doe v. Eyre was sought to be distinguished from
Jackson v. Noble on very doubtful grounds.
It is submitted that much is to be said in opposition to the
1L R. 7 H. L .88.
" 5 American Edition. chapter 50, English edition of
" ii C. E. Green 234.
2159 N. J. Eq. 336.
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English authorities and in favor of the view that though the
contingency has happened, yet if B cannot for some reason take,
the estate shall become indefeasible in A. Of course the testator could, if he chose, take the estate from A on the happening
of the contingency irrespective of whether B was able to take,
but why assume that he would so intend? The real point for
consideration is what the testator has intended shall happen in
a situation where the testator has not clearly expressed his intention, i. e., in case of the contingency having occurred and the
gift over failing to take effect. There is of course a presumption in favor* of vested rather than contingent gifts; cannot
this presumption be properly extended to a case like this, with
the result that the gift remains with the original devisee, who
is undoubtedly the primary object of the testator's bounty,
rather than go to his residuary devisees or heirs? 'The general
presumption against intestacy may also be invoked. It is submitted that while the easy solution is -the one furnished by the
English decisions, yet that the testator's intent is more likely to
be accomplished if the ruling of cases like Jackson v. Noble is
adopted.
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